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CASE NOTES
Antitrust
Exclusive Agreement Between Hospital and Physician
May Violate Antitrust Laws
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts refused
to grant summary judgment to a hospital that alleged, as a defense, that
an exclusive contract for anesthesiology services it had entered into with
a physician violated the antitrust laws. The court found that violations of
state and federal antitrust laws may be demonstrated by an exclusive
agreement between a physician and hospital for services, however such a
showing had not been made as a matter of law.'
Plaintiffbrought an action against the hospital when it terminated his
exclusive dealings contract,2 granting him the exclusive right to practice
anesthesiology and appoint all future anesthesiologists at the hospital. The
contract was automatically renewable for successive five-year terms until
the physician died, suffered a career-ending disability, or lost his license
to practice medicine
The hospital defended its termination of the contract by bringing a
counterclaim against the physician, alleging the exclusive dealings
contract violated state and federal antitrust laws.4 In reviewing the
antitrust claims, the court identified the issues as (i) whether the exclusive
dealings contract substantially foreclosed the relevant market; and (H)
whether there were probable immediate and future anticomp etitive effects
resulting from this contract. Given the potential harms and benefits
flowing from the exclusive dealings contract, the court applied a rule of
reason to deciding whether antitrust violations had occurredV
On the foreclosure claim, the court found the hospital had not met its
burden of showing substantial foreclosure in the relevant market.
Likewise, the physician did not show a lack of foreclosure in the relevant
market. Therefore, the court refused to grant either parties' motion for

Pan-h v. Franklin Medical Ctr., 940 F. Supp. 395 (D. Mass. 1996).
2 Id at400.
3 Id at398-399.
4 I at 400.
5 Parikk 940 F. Supp. at401-402.
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summary judgment, finding such judgment should be reserved for trial.'
On the anticompetitive effects claim, the court found the exclusive
dealings contract raised significant antitrust concerns. First, the court
found the automatic renewal clause in the contract, which permitted the
physician to continue his exclusive arrangement for the remainder of his
career, was an unreasonable restraint on competition. Second, -the contract
afforded the hospital no leverage for assuring quality performance from
the physician, and failed to provide performance standards, notice of
termination, or competitive bidding.7
The court concluded the physician's conduct and the one-sided terms
of the exclusive dealings contract could be shown to generate substantial
anticompetitive effects in the market for anesthesia services. However,
since no such shovfing had been made as a matter of law, summary
judgment was not warranted Parikh v. FranklinMedical Cr., 940 F.
Supp. 395 (D. Mass. 1996).

Hospitals Permitted to Merge for the
Purpose of Efficiency
The United States District Court for the Western District o? Michigan
denied the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin defendant hospitals from merging.9 The court found
the defendant hospitals had successfiflly rebutted any presumption of
illegality, and had demonstrated that the merger would create significant
efficiencies in the relevant markets and provide higher qua[lity care at
reduced prices.
Plaintiff FTC brought an action for preliminary injunction against
hospitals planning to merge, alleging the proposed merger would violate
Federal antitrust laws, because the hospitals involved were both located

Id at 404.
Id at 405-406.
8 Id at406.
9 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
6

7

1997]

CASE NOTES

411

in the same city and were the largest comprehensive care hospitals in the
0
city.'
To establish itsprimafaciecase, the FTC was required to define the
relevant product and geographic market, and show the proposed merger
would substantially increase the hospitals' concentration of power in the
relevant markets." The FTC limited its definition of relevant product
market to hospitals that provided inpatient services only, whereas the
hospitals argued that outpatient care providers should also be included in
the relevant product market, because outpatient services were a reasonable
alternative for patients unable to afford inpatient care should the proposed
hospital merger increase the price of inpatient hospitalization. The court
rejected the hospitals argument, finding outpatient services were not an
appropriate substitute for inpatient services simply because of an increase
in the cost of inpatient care.'
Additionally, the court accepted the FTC definition of relevant
geographic market for both acute and primary inpatient care. Analyzing
patient flow data, the court found the city in which the hospitals were
located, plus the area encompassed within a thirty-mile radius of the city,
was the relevant geographic market for acute care, while the immediate
city area was the relevant geographic market for primary care. 3 The court
rejected the hospitals' arguments against the FTC definition, finding the
areas identified by the FTC accurately reflected the source of the
hospitals' admitted patients, and the area within which most residents
remained for hospital care.'4
Finally, the court held the FTC had successfully established the
proposed hospital merger would significantly increase the concentration
of power in the relevant markets. Relying on statistical data, the court
found the FTC had demonstrated the merger could create, enhance, or

10 Id

1 Id at1289-1290.
Id at 1290

12

13Federal Trade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1291-1294.
14 Id at 1292 (using zip code information from the Michigan Hospital Association and
applying the "Elzinga-Hogarty test.).
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facilitate a potential that the hospitals enhanced market power could be
exercised in anticompetitive ways. 5
The hospitals, however, successfully rebutted the presumption of
illegality by presenting empirical evidence that nonprofit hospital mergers
do not cause health care prices to increase when the hospital boards are
controlled by persons representing the interests ofhealth care consumers."
In addition, the defendant hospitals agreed to enter into a consent decree
to prevent price increases 17 and prove to the court that the merger would
create significant efficiencies in the relevant markets allowing the
hospitals to provide higher quality care at reduced prices."8 .Because the
high concentration ofpower arising out of the hospitals' merger would not
result in increased prices, the FTC's motion for preliminary injunction
was denied. FederalTrade Comm'n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946
F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
Arbitration
De Novo Clause Invalidated in Patient-Physician
Arbitration Contract
The Court of Appeals of California confirmed plaintiff's petition to
confirm an arbitration judgment and found a de novo clause in an
arbitration agreement allowing a patient or physician to ignore the
outcome of arbitration was unenforceable and would only benefit the
physician. 9
Plaintiff who had contracted with defendant physician to have a
chemical skin peel performed on her face, brought suit for negligence
when she suffered severe burns as a result of the treatment. Pursuant to an

Is

Id. at 1294 (citing Federal Trade Commission v. University Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206,

1218 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Archer-Deaniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242,246 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809 (1989)).
16 Id at 1295 (citing William 3. Lynk, Ph.D., NonprofitHospitalMergersand the Exerclse
ofMarket Power.38 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOmIcS 437 (1995)).
17 Id at 1298.
' Id at 1300.
'9 Saikav. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Cal. Ct App. 1996).
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arbitration clause included in the treatment contract, the parties went to
arbitration. When the plaintiffwas awarded more than $25,000 dollars in
damages, the physician invoked a de novo clause included in the contract
that permitted either party to request a court to litigate the dispute if an
amount exceeding $25,000 dollars was awarded.
In holding the patient's petition to confirm the judgment should
prevail, the court looked to public policy and held the purpose of
arbitration was to promote efficiency, expediency, and finality. 0 Since
requiring the patient to submit to a trial would make the finality of
arbitration illusory and impose unnecessary casts onthe patient, the court
decided the clause violated public policy.21
Finally, the court also considered each parties' bargaining power and
concluded the de novo clause had meaning only to the physician because,
the damage award would rarely be low enough for litigation to be a costeffective option for a patient to redecide the proper amount of damages.2
Saika v. Gold, 56 CaL Rptr.2d 922 (CaL Cf. App. 1996).

Civil Rights
Nurse and Security Officer Liable for Failure to Protect
A Patient Abused in State Hospital
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part,
and affirmed in part, a suit against a state hospital security officer and
nurse brought under civil rights laws for failure to protect a patient who
was beaten by a hospital security officer.P
Plaintiff patient at state hospital brought a civil rights action against
a security officer and nurse who failed to intervene when plaintiff was
assaulted by a hospital security officer. Plaintiff also brought suit against
the physician who failed to diagnose his broken arm and the hospital

21 Id. at 922-923.
21 Id at 926.
22

Id at 925-926.

21

Durham v. Nu'Man, 97 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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administrator for "failure to adequately train security officers." 24 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.P
On appeal, the court reversed in part, upholding the patient's claims
against the security guard and nurse who failed to intervene, finding the
hospital was a custodial facility; moreover, the patient had no way to
defend himself against the attack. 6 The court found because the security
guard had a badge of authority, he therefore had a duty to protect the
patient from assault by other officers? 7 Similarly, the court found a
nurse's duty to protect any patient under her charge and to intervene when
a patient is being harmed.28
On the counts brought against the physician and administrator, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment. The court found the patient's claims against the physician went
to the adequacy of the medical care and did not allege unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain or deliberate indifference in violation of the
patient's civil rights.' Further, the court found the patient had failed to
demonstrate that the administrator authorized, approved, or acquiesced to
the brutal assault in violation of the patient's civil rights.3" Durhamv.
NuMan, 97F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 1996).
Discovery
Hospital Peer Review Records are not Protected From
State Medical Board Subpoena
The Supreme Court of California held an investigative subpoeaa issued by
the state medical board (Board) in its investigation of a physician
suspected of on-duty drug use was not considered "discovery," and was,

2S
26

Id. at 864.
Id
Id at 868.

27

Id

2

Id

2

Id at 869.

24

30

Id at 869-870.
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therefore, not protected by a state statute protecting hospital peer review
records from discovery3
PlaintiffBoard began investigating the conduct of an anesthesiologist
after a confidential informant reported the physician was a drug addict
who had been under the influence of narcotics while on duty. The Board
investigator learned the physician had a long history of drug addiction and
had recently taken a leave of absence for inpatient drug treatment a
Moreover, the hospital that employed the physician was aware of the
physician's drug addiction and had placed the physician on restrictive
duty.
When the hospital refused to provide peer review documents related
to the physician's drug use,33 theBoard issued a subpoena requesting the
hospital documents. Both the state and appellate court enforced the
34
subpoena and ordered the hospital to comply
The hospital appealed from the appellate court decision arguing the
state evidence code protected the documents from discovery' 5 based on a
provision in the state evidence code protecting hospital peer review
committee records from discovery. The court examined whether the
Board's request for peer review documents could be considered
"discovery" within the meanting ofthe statute,36 and concluded that when
enacting the code the legislature had not intended to immunize peer
review records from investigative subpoenas by administrative agencies
such as the Board?' Since state law authorized the Board to issue
subpoenas in any inquiry or investigation, the court granted its petition3
Arneft v. Dal Cielo, 56 CaL R1ptr.2d 706 (CaL 1996).

31
2

33
34

3S

Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (Cal. 1996).

Idat 713.
Id"
Id at714

Id. at714-715.

36 Id at 715 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157(a) (West 1996)).
11 Arnett, 56 CaL Rptr. 2d at 716-719.
31 Id at722.
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Discrimination
"Material Adversity" Required Under the ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circui affirmed a
district court's grant of summary judgment to an employer on a
discrimination claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) by a registered nurse hired as a nursing supervisor.
Plaintiff alleged her employer, an intermediate nursing care
institution, denied her a promotion, demoted her, failed to accommodate
her, and constructively discharged her in violation of the ADA; because
she had multiple sclerosis. " The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the nursing care institution upon finding the nurse
was not qualified for the promotion, and upon finding the nursing care
institution had articulated a non-discriminatory reason for reasigning thp
nurse. In addition, the court determined the nurse had never sought any
accommodations from her employer and had failed to present any
evidence that she had been compelled to resign.40
In evaluating the plaintiffs claims, the appellate court first
questioned the nurse's status as a "qualified individual with a disability,"
because there was no evidence the nursing care institution regarded the
nurse as being unable to perform all the duties of her job. For the
purposes of summary judgment however, the court assumed the nurse
41
could establish she had a disability under the ADA.
The court next tried to determine whether the nurse could meet her
burden under the ADA and persuade a trier of fact that- illegal
discrimination took place. Affirming the district court's decision to
dismiss the nurse's claims, the court found the plaintiff could not establish
the nursing institution's alleged actions were "materially adverse," a
requirement of a prima facie case under the ADA.42

39 Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213).
40 Id at 881-882.
41 Id at 884-885.
42 Id. at 885.
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The appellate court also found the nurse had failed to state a genuine
issue of material fact under any of her claims. First, because the nurse
stated firmly in her deposition that she had never requested an
accommodation, the court held her 'ailure to accommodate" claim must
fail!' Second, because the nurse did not introduce evidence, showing the
particular certification required for the promotion she sought was not a
genuine prerequisite, the court found her 'ailure to promote" claim must
fail." Third, because the nurse failed to demonstrate her reassignment
from nursing supervisor to unit registered nurse was a materially adverse
change in the terms of her employment, the court determined her
"demotion' claim must fail.4 Finally, because the nurse could not
describe one specific instance of difficult or unpleasant conduct by the
nursing care institute, the court held her "constructive discharge?' claim
must fail. 6 Koesis v. Multi-Care Management,97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir.
1996).
"Overly Cautious" Employer Held Liable for
Discrimination for Dismissal of
HIV-Postive Employee
The Supreme Court ofIlinois held constructive discharge of an employee
diagnosed as HIV positive constituted unlawful discrimination, finding the
defendant had acted in an overly cautious manner when plaintiffs disease
did not interfere with his ability to perform his job47
Plaintiff was discharged from his position as a cook at a nursing
home until his supervisor could obtain information regarding rules or
regulations that would determine whether the employee could perform his
job. Although the supervisor was unable to obtain clear advice on how to
handle the situation from any regulating agencies, the employee brought
a note from his physician stating the infection did not prevent him from

Id.at 886.
44
45

47

Id.at 887.
Id
RainteHealth Care Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 672NX2d 1136 (I. 1996).
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working s When plaintiff did not hear from his supervisor fbr over three
weeks regarding the status of his employment, he applied for
unemployment benefits. The employer contested the benefits, arguing the
employee had never been terminated officially.4 9
The court found the plaintiff was unlawfully discriminated against,
because his disease did not interfere with his ability to perform his job.5 °
Additionally, the court ruled the nursing home's failure to perform an
investigation into whether the employee's infection precluded him from
performing his job, violated the state's expressed requirement to base
eligibility to work on an individual basis.5 Although the defendant argued
it had expressed good faith intentions to abide by the rules and
regulations, the court refused to find any good faith exception to unlawful
discrimination52 and concluded the physician's note explaining that
plaintiff could work was sufficient notice for the nursing home. 3 Raintree
Health Care Ctr. v. IllinoisHuman Rights Com 'n, 672 N.E.2d 1136
(i1 1996).

Employment
Claims of Disparagement, Antitrust Violation, and
Contract Interferene Inadequate to
Establish Wronful Dismissal
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a claim by
hospital physicians with suspended privileges against hospital, parent
corporation, hospital administrator, and hospital chief of stafffor business
disparagement, antitrust violations, and tortious interference with an

48 Id. at 1138-1139.
49 Id at 1139-1140.
so I at 1143.
si Id at 1142-1143 (citing Ill. Rev.

Stat 1987, ch. 68, 1 1-103(0)(1); Board ofTrustees of the
University of Illinois v. Human Rights Conm'n, 485 N.E.2d 33 (Il. App. 1985); Melvin v. City
of West Frankfort, 417 N.E.2d 260 (ll. App. 1981).
52 Id at 1145-1147.

53 Iad at 1145.
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employment contract. The court held the physicians failed to meet their
evidentiary burdens on each of the claims.5 4
Plaintiff physicians commenced litigation when their hospital
privileges were suspended by the defendants who discovered the
physicians' had violated Medicare policies by administering unapproved
drugs and unapproved doses of medication to patients in the
environmental care unit (ECU).5'
First, the court held the physicians had failed to adequately state a
claim for business disparagement since they could not show any
disparaging words, falsity, malice, lack of privilege, or special damages
by way of publication by the defendants.5!6 Additionally, in order to prove
special damages, the physicians needed to present evidence of direct
pecuniary loss resulting from the defendants' false communications, but
were unable to prove a direct loss of any kind. 7
Next, the physicians asserted an antitrust claim, arguing the
defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to prevent them from operating
the ECU. To sustain this claim, the physicians were required to show the
hospital and its officials had engaged in a conspiracy against them, and
exclude the possibility that an independent action had produced some
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.58 The court found, however,
the physicians could not allege the existence of conspiracy absent an
independent action, because hospital personnel unilaterally decided to
close the ECU. Moreover, the physicians could not demonstrate the
defendants were competing with them at the time of the suspensions and
closure.5 9
Finally, the physicians alleged the hospital administrators had
tortiously interfered with their employment contract with the hospital. In
its analysis of this claim, the court adhered to the standard set forth by a
state supreme court decision, requiring a plaintiff to prove the existence
of a contract subject to interference, a willful or intentional act of
interference, and that the intentional act was the proximate cause of the
I Johnson v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).
55 Id at387-389.
-' Id. at 391.
5

Id

' Iad at 392.
59 Id at 392-393.
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plaintiffs' damages.P In applying this test, the court held the hospital had
established its legal right to close the ECU since there was nD agreement
between the hospital and the physicians requiring the hospital to keep the
ECU open. Johnson v. Hospital Corp. ofAm, 95 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.
1996).

Insurance

Denial of Coverage for Experimental Breast
Cancer Therapy Upheld
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a
decision by the Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) to deny payment to a -plaintiff for
medical treatment for advanced stage breast cancer.6' CHAMPUS is a
health care plan established by Congress in accordance with the
Dependents' Medical Care Act and is funded by annual congressional
appropriations. It is considered an "at risk" health care plan, because its
beneficiaries do not know prior to receiving treatment whether the
treatment will be reimbursed -or not.62 The plan contains a general
exclusion clause for experimental or investigation procedures; however,
the remainder of coverage determinations are ultimately within the
discretion of the Director.63
Plaintiff patient brought an action challenging the CHAMPUS
Director's refusal to pay for high-dose chemotherapy treatment and stemcell replacement therapy recommended by the patient's physician to treat
her breast cancer. 64 This recommended treatment has generated debate
within the medical community, and some experts regard it as
"experimental. ' 65

6 Id at 394.

61 Smith v. Office of Civilian Health & Medical Program of the Uniformed Servs., 97 F.3d
950 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1071).
62 Id
63Id
6 Id at 952-954.
ssIdat 953.
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The court refused to challenge one sector ofthe medical community's
conclusion that the treatment was experimental, and stated it would only
reverse the CHAMPUS decision if it was found to be arbitrary. 5 The
court concluded that as a reviewing court, in the face of disagreement
among a host of medical experts, it could not obviate an agency decision
that supported one side of an issue. Consequently, the court found the
decision to be the kind that Congress intended to leave to administrative
agencies 7 Smith v. Offwe of CivilianHealth & Medical Program ofthe
UniformedServs., 97F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 1996).

Insurance Consultants Liable for Bad Advice
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a
lower court's dismissal of an action brought by a company, under ERISA
and state medical malpractice laws, against insurance consultants upon
whom the company had relied for advice on group health insuranceS
Plaintiff brought suit against insurance consultants it had hired to
provide advice on funding its self-insured employee health benefit plan.
Plaintiffwas convinced by defendants to cancel its insurance policy with
Blue Cross and accept defendant's less expensive health benefit plan.!9
When the advice given by the consultants turned out to be flawed, the
plaintiff was forced to meet more than $600,000 in medical expenses.70
The court first determined that a company that contracts with
insurance consultants for a health plan has standing as a fiduciary under
ERISA to sue for ERISA violations when the company retains its power
to amend the health plan and appoint, retain, or remove the health plan's
management by exercising its discretionary authorityZ1 Next, the court
determined the health plan had suffered a loss as a matter of law and
"common sense," because it had less money available to pay benefits than

6s ME at 957-960.
67 MEat 961.

I Coyne &Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 1457(4th Cir. 1996) (citing 29
69 IR at 1462.
70 Id at 1463.
71 Id at 1464-1466.

U.S.C. § 101).
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it would have had without the consultants' poor advice andt breach of
fiduciary duty.72
Finally, the court determined that ERISA did not preempt the
company's professional malpractice claims against the consultants as
insurance professionals, and found the plaintiff could bring malpractice
actions based on traditional state law.73 Moreover, the court found the
existence of an ERISA plan was not critical to the malpractice claim;,
because the claim would have existed even had the consultants procured
no plan at all. Finally, because the malpractice action did not relate to any
employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, the claim was not
preempted.74 Coyne &.Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.3d 145:7 (4th Cir.
1996).

Court has Jurisdiction to Review Out-of-State
Insurance Company's Decision to Deny
Coverage for an Abuse of Discretion
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied an
insurance company's motion to dismiss claims for lack of personal
jurisdiction brought by a out-of-state hospital alleging the insurance
company had violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), and had breached its insurance contracts by denying payment to
the hospital for in-patient psychiatric care of two insureds.75
Plaintiffhospital providing in-patient psychiatric care to two insureds
at an out-of-state hospital brought suit when the insurance company
refused to reimburse the hospital for care received past a certein number
of days due to "lack of medical necessity." 76 Subsequently, the hospital
filed suit against the insurance company alleging ERISA and breach of
contract violations.77

2 IH at 1466.
73 Iae
at 1466-1472.
74 Id.

I Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI, 97 F.3d 822 (5th Cir. 1996).
7 Iad at 824-825.
77 Id at 825.
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The court found it had personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state
insurance company; because ERISA provides for nationwide service of
process, and allows personal jurisdiction over a defendant anywhere in the
United States provided the defendant has minimum contacts with the
United States.78
Finally, the court found the district court had properly reviewed the
insurance company's decision to the deny the hospital's claims for "abuse
of discretion,"7 9 finding the insurance company had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying the hospital's claims for payment when both
patients met two of the insurance company's own criteria for determining
necessity of in-patient psychiatric care.," Bellaire Getz. Hosp. v.Blue
Cross & Blue Shield ofAf,97 F.3d 822 (5th Cir. 1996).
Employer May Violate ERISA by Discontinuing Payment
of Employees' Insurance Premiums
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
summary judgment for an employer who had discontinued insurance
premiums of employees qualified to receive benefits under the employer's
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) long-term disability
plan. The court remanded the case, finding a genuine issue ofmaterial fact
existed as to whether payment of insurance premiums could be
considered a "benefit" under the ERISA plan.s'
Plaintiff employees, as a certified class, appealed a summary
judgment decision for their employer against -whomthey had brought suit
alleging a breach of contract and fiduciary duty under ERISA.Y
.Plaintiff's employer, who had been providing long-term disability benefits
under an ERISA long-term disability plan, sold a division of its
corp oration to another company who then became responsible for benefits
under the long-term disability plan. Shortly thereafter, the employer

78 At at 825-826.

79 Bellaire Gen. Hosp., 97 F.3d at 828.
kd
M at 829-832.
g Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996).
2

-dat 1509 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
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notified employees receiving long-term disability benefits that it was
discontinuing premiums under the plan, and that covered employees
would have to pay their own premiums in order to continue receiving
83
benefits.
The employees first argued they were entitled to have insurance
premiums paid by their employer pursuant to the terms of the plan when
they qualified to receive long-term disability benefits." The court,
however, rejected this argument because a clause in the plan explicitly
reserved the employer's right to change or discontinue benefits. Because
any promise of benefits was subject to the reserved rights, the court held
premium payments did not vest upon the employees' qualification for
benefits.85
Plaintiffs next argued that their right to have insurance premiums
paid by the employer vested when the plan was terminated. 5 The court
found this argument was consistent with the terms of the plan, that
provided a promise on the part of the employer to continue benefits to
qualified employees in the event of termination of the plan.87 The
employees contended the plan had terminated when the employer
transferred responsibility for the long-term disability plan. to a new
company. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, 8 but also found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the payment of insurance premiums
was a "benefit" under the ERISA plan. Therefore, the court held summary
judgment was inappropriate and remanded the case Ior further
proceedings.8 9 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996).

13

4

Ia at 1508-1509.

IL

9 Id at 1511-1514.
96 Chiles, 95 F.3d at 1514.
87

Id

83 Id at 1515-1516.
89

IAd at 1517-1519.
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Medical Malpractice
Connecticut Court Allows Cause of Action for
"Lost Chance of Survival"
The Appellate Court of Connecticut fund a trial court had erred by not
recognizing a cause of action for lost chance of survival.
Plaintiff administratrix appealed a lower court decision seeking to set
aside verdict in a medical malpractice suit brought on behalf of a patient
who died of amyocardial infarction. Plaintiff alleged the cardiologist who
had treated the patient for a previous myocardial infarction~d had caused
decedent to suffer a"lost" or decreased chance of survival because of the
cardiologist's negligence. Plaintiff argued the decedent's abnormal stress
test imposed a duty on the cardiologist to follow up with the decedent,
even when the decedent failed to show up for a scheduled follow-up
visit 9 '
The court examined the case and found that a growing line of "loss
of a chance" cases had led to the relaxation of traditional causation
standards. Instead, three specific approaches to causation have emergedf 2
The first approach, the relaxed causation approach, allows recovery by
plaintiffs if the lost chance was a substantial or significant chance of
survivaIl 3 The second approach is the "proportional approach," under
which a plaintiff's lost chance is compensated proportionately based on
the amount of the loss caused by the tortious conduct 4 The final
"traditional approach" adheres to the traditional model of causation, and
requires the defendant have more probably than not caused the ultimate
5
injury
By looking to precedent, the court determined that the state had
recognized a cause of action for loss of chance of survival,95 which
requires that plaintiffs prove they were deprived of a chance of survival,
I Borkowski v. Sacheti, 682 A.2d 1095 (Conn. App. 1996).
at 1097-1098.
91 Mad
9 Id at 1099-1100.
IE at 1100.
9 Borkowsk, 682A.2d at 110I.

95 Id at 1102.
96Id at 1103 (citing LaBienice v. Baker, 526 A.2d 1341 (Conn. 1937)).
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and that the lost chance was more likely than not caused by the
defendant's negligence?" Finding the trial court had erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on this theory, the court remanded the case. 9S Borkowski
v. Sachet, 682 A.2d 1095 (Conn. App. 1996).

Medicare/Medicaid
Reimbursement Limited to Actual Costs to
Commonly Owned Supplier
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
medical corporation employee's criminal conviction for mtking false
claims under Medicare. The court found the employee had concealed
material facts in submitting Medicare reimbursement cost reports.
Defendant employee of medical corporation was responsible for
calculating Medicare reimbursements on behalf of several hospitals. Part
of the employee's responsibilities were to supervise a group of
accountants who prepared cost reports to file with private insurance
companies who acted as intermediaries under contract with the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA).99 Based upon these cost reports,
the intermediaries would determine the correct amount of Medicare
reimbursement for the year and pay the amount due directly or bill for the
excess paid.10 Defendant was charged and convicted for fUse claims
made in cost reports that he filed on behalf of numerous hospitals over a
period of years.' 0'
The government argued that defendant had made false
representations by claiming reimbursement for costs that were
nonreimbursable under the applicable Medicare guidelines.0 2 The
employee, however, insisted the Medicare guidelines did not clearly
97

Id

at 1104.

9' Id at 1106.

1 Id at 522. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is the government agency
responsible for administering the Medicare program. Iad
110 Id. at 523.
101 Id
102

Id at524.
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delineate the costs as nonreimbursable; and, therefore, his claim for
reimbursement could not have been a false representation forming the
basis for criminal liability. 03
The court rejected the employee's arguments and found federal
regulations governed the present situation in which royalties and interest
were paid to the medical corporation by hospitals owned by the same
corporation. 1' 4 Under the federal regulations, a provider that obtains
services, facilities, or supplies from an organization related through
common ownership may only be reimbursed for "the costs for these items
at the cost to the supplying organization.' 0 5 In this case, royalty fees paid
to the company by its own hospitals solely for the use of the company's
name would not be an actual expense, and therefore would not be
reimbursable."° Similarly, interest paid to the medical corporation by its
hospitals would be nonreimbursable, unless the corporation was actually
paying an outside lender.
Finally, the court held the evidence presented was sufficient to
establish that the employee had acted to conceal the true nature of the
medical corporation's advertising expenses by labeling such expenses as
"oiitreach" in order to get full reimbursement.'0 7 Because his action
concealed a material fact, the employee violated the law.' UntkedStates
v. Calhoon,97F.2d 518 (11th Cir. 1996).

Mental Health
Deceased Mental Health Patients' Records may be
Disclosed to Federal Agency
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ordered a
residential care facility for the mentally disabled to release two residents'

"I CaIhoon,97F.3d at525.
104 1&

I Id at 526 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.17).
107

Ia at 528-529.

,CICalhoon, 97 F.3d at 529.
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records to a federal agency mandated to protect the rights of he mentally
disabled, so the agency could investigate the deaths of the :residents. °9
The federal agency brought an action against the residential care facility,
custodian of records, state department of mental health and mental
retardation, and the state department of mental health and mental
retardation commissioner, associate commissioner, and custodian of
records, for failure to provide the agency with requested records.1n
The federal agency was notified of potential abuse occurring at the
treating facility by an anonymous telephone caller who relayed specific
information regarding the deaths of two of the facility's residents."' In
response to the telephone call, the federal agency requested the residents'
records; however, the defendants and the residents' former guardians
refused to release the requested records. The federal agency brought suit
2
to obtain the records."
The court articulated three statutory requirements the agency needed
to fulfill before they could obtain the records. First, the resident whose
records were sought must have a mental illness or disability. Second, the
resident must not have a legal representative. Third, a complaint must
have been made to the agency regarding abuse or neglect of the resident,
or there must have been probable cause to believe there has been abuse or
3
neglect."
Although the defendants argued the records should not be released
because the residents' families objected, the court ruled the deaths of the
residents ended the families' status as legal guardians.1 4 Further, the
court found the anonymous telephone call constituted a complaint since
it was specific and provided enough evidence to give rise to probable
cause of abuse and neglect." 5 Concluding all three requirements were
met, the court ordered the defendants to release all relevant records to the

'1

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. LS. Tarwater Developmental Center, 97 F.3d

492 (11th Cir. 1996).
10

Id at 495.

"I Id
112 Id
113 Id
1
"s

Id. at 497498.
Id at 498-499.
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federal agency.AlabamaDsabilitiesAdvocacyProgran. I.S. Tanvater
DevelopmentalCtr., 97F.3d 492 (11th Cir.1996).
Negligence

Physicians Do Not Owe A Duty to Third Parties Resulting in
Liability for Failure to Warn a Patient Not to Drive
The Supreme Court of Kansas granted summary judgment in favor of a
physician charged by third party plaintiffs injured by a patient of the
physician in a head-on automobile collision." 6 The court found no
physician duty existed to members ofthe driving public to warn a patient
who already knew that she suffered from a sleep disorder, not to drive.
Plaintiff automobile drivers brought a negligence suit to recover
damages suffered in a head on-collision with patient of physician who
was being treated for a sleep disorder. The third party plaintiffs were
involved in a collision when the patient fell asleep while driving and
veered across the road. Plaintiffs alleged the physician's failure to warn
his patient not to drive constituted negligent treatment 117 The ease was
brought before the state supreme court to determine whether the physician
had a duty to members of the driving public to warn the patient not to
drive.118
The court first considered a provision of the RESTATE MENT OF TORTS
that imposes a duty to control the conduct ofthird parties when a "special
relationship" exists.1 9 The court looked at prior state cases that imposed
a special relationship duty to control, and found the cases were concerned
exclusively with dangerous persons in custodial settings."'2 Further, the
court found the Restatement provision only imposed a duty to control
when the party owing that duty had the ability or right to control the third
party causing the harm; in this case, the plaintiff; conceded the physician
1, Cahvell v. Hassan, M.D., 925 P.2d 422 (Kan. 1996).
Id at 424-426.
" Id at424.
119 Id at 428-429.
170 Id at 430. (citing Mahomes-Vinson v. United States, 751 F. Supp. 913 (D. Kan 1990);
C.JW. v. State, 677 P.2d 1017 (Kan. 1993); Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1984);
Washington v. State, 839 P.2d 555 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992), rnv. denid252 Kan. 1095 (1992)).
117
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had no duty to control his patient, but rather a duty to warn.'2 Finally,
because the patient was aware of her sleep disorder, the court found the
physician had no duty to warn his patient of what she already knew.'2
A second provision of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS imposes liability
for third party injuries when an individual chooses to render services to
another in order to protect the third party, but, does so without exercising
reasonable care, thereby, increasing the risk of harm to the third party. 3
The court found the physician did not act to protect third parties from the
patient's driving, nor did his treatment of the patient increase the risk of
harm to the plaintiffs. 12 4 Again, the court considered the patient's
knowledge of her sleep disorder and declined to impose on the physician
a duty to warn his patient of something of which she was already aware.
The court found imposition of such a duty would subject a physician to
liability claims from unknown parties for the acts of patients over which
a physician had no control."z Calwell v. Hassan, M.D., 925 P.2d 422
(Kan. 1996).

Physician's Stipulated Negligence Not Binding
on Suit Against Hospital
The Court of Appeals of California held a stipulated judgment against a
physician who admitted negligence in his treatment of a patient did not
foreclose ajury determination of the physician's negligence in a pending
action against the hospital that had granted the physician surgical
privileges. 2 6 The court concluded a stipulated judgment against the
physician did not invoke resjudicataas to the hospital's liability since to
do so would unduly burden the due process rights of the hospital, and any
future defendants that may choose to go to court. 27
Id. at 431-432. (citing Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995); C.MV. v. State, 677
P.2d 1017 (Kan. 1993)).
In Id. at 432.
123 Id
124 Id at433.
12S Id
12 Knowles v. Tehachapi Valley Hosp. Dist, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. CL App. 1996).
121

Iz' Id.
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Plaintiffs brought a negligence suit against both the hospital where
treatment had been provided, and the treating physician for negligent
treatment of decedent spouse and parent. The suit against the physician
was settled when both parties stipulated to the physician's negUgence. 28
The patient's family, however, persisted in their negligence claim against
the hospital, alleging it had acted negligently by allowing the physician to
treat the patient when he lacked both the skills and medical malpractice
insurance.1l 9
Plaintiffs first argued the physician's stipulated admission of
negligence invoked resjudicataand barred the hospital from introducing
evidence at trial to disprove the physician's negligence." Although the
court recognized that resjudicata forecloses parties and privies from
retrying a cause of action after an issue has been decided, it found the
physician's stipulation was not binding on the hospital because, the
hospital was not required to put forth an argument or defense that the
physician was not negligent.'3 ' Further, the court found the physician's
testimony was permissible at the hospital's trial, noting that to allow
otherwise would permit plaintiffs in a multi-defendant suit to elect to
settle claims -withcertain defendants and then use settlement agreements
to hold remaining defendants liable without allowing them a fair chance
to present their case in court. Knowles v. TehachapiValley Hosp. Dist.,
57 CaL Rptr. 2d 192 (CaL Ct App. 1996).

Patient Cannot Recover for Fear of Contracting
HIV and AIDS
The Court ofAppeals of Texas affirmed a district court's decision to grant
summary judgment to a hospital in a negligence action brought by a
patient who received a transfusion of banked blood even though she had
expressly limited her consent to the use of blood donated by friends for

12

Ha at 195.

Id
o Id at 195-196.
IIdc at 196-197.

129
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the purpose of transfusions related to her surgery13 2 The court held the
plaintiff could not recover on her claims; because she had failed to prove
she was actually exposed to IUV or AIDS, could not demonstrate that she
had suffered an injury to support an award for mental anguish, or that her
fear of contracting AIDS was reasonable.
Plaintiff made arrangements in advance to use blood donated by
friends during her planned surgery. Because the amount of collected
blood was insufficient, the hospital used one unit of banked blood. 'When
the patient was informed, she brought suit against the hospital for
negligence, breach of implied warranty, and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (DTPA) violations. Finding the plaintiff did not test positive for HIV,
the appellate court affirmed summary judgment on all count,.'3
The patient first argued the hospital was negligent when it breached
its duty to transfuse her solely with direct donor blood, causing her to
4
suffer anxiety and concern over possible contraction of HLV and AIDS.1
Since the patient could not prove she was actually exposed to H[ or
AIDS, she could not demonstrate that she had suffered an injury to
support an award for mental anguish or that her fear of contracting AIDS
was reasonable. 35 Additionally, the court held the patient was barred as
a matter of law from recovering under either DTPA, or implied warranty
theories, because neither cause of action was viable in a negligence claim
against medical professionals.136 Drury v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 933
S. W.2d 668 (Tex. C App. 1996).

No Duty to Discover Existence of Disease
During Pre-employment Physical
The Court of Appeals of South Carolina upheld a directed vrdict for an
employer who had required his employee to undergo a physical
examination prior to employment. The court found that neither a

132

Dnuy v. Baptist Mem'I Hosp. Sys., 933 S.W.2d 668 (IX. Ct. App. 1996).

133
13

Id at 669.671.
Id at 671.

135

Id at 673-674.

136

Id at 676-677.
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physician who examines ajob applicant to determine fitness for ajob, nor
the employer who hires the physician, owes a duty to an employee to
137
discover the existence of a disease.
Plaintiff appealed a decision for defendant in a suit brought against
her employer, and the employer's physician, who had required plaintiff to
undergo a pre-employment physical examination that revealed employee
had high blood pressure. Although the physician suggested the employee
follow up with her family doctor, she was cleared for employment and
shortly thereafter died from heart failure while working. A claim was
brought on behalf of the employee against the employer and the
physician, 13 8 alleging the physician had been negligent in performing the
physical; because the physician failed to conduct further evaluation,
suspend employment or inform the employee about coronary artery
disease. 13 9 Plaintiff also claimed the employer should be held liable;
because it undertook to require a physical of all employees through a
negligent physician; and because the employer had failed to follow its
own policy requiring further evaluation of employee's condition. 4 "
The court found that in order to bring a cause of action for medical
malpractice against the physician, plaintiff had to establish that a
physician-patient relationship existed. 14 1 The court looked to decisions
from other jurisdictions regarding physicians retained by third parties in
order to examine an individual. These decisions held that physicians were
not liable to ani examined individual for failure to treat or care for the
individual, as long as no offer of treatment was made and no injury was
suffered during the examination. Applying this rule, the court found a
directed verdict in favor ofthe physician was proper because the physician
had neither injured the employee during the examination nor offered to
42
-treat or care for the employee; thus, the physician was not culpable.1
Next the court found that employers only have a duty to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of physicians for pre-employment physical

137
3

Tumblin v. Ball-Incon Glass Packaging Corp., 478 S.E.d 81 (S.C. App. 1996).
Iad at 83.

19 Id at 84.
14D
141

Id
Tumblin, 478 SE.2d at 85.

142 id
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examinations. 43 If the employer selects a reasonably competent
physician, there can be no employer liability for default, mistake, or
malpractice on the part of the physician. In this case, the court found the
examining physician was competent; because he had both reported the
decedent's elevated blood pressure to the employer; and brought the
matter to the employee's attention, suggesting she follow up with her
personal physician. 144
Finally, the court looked to public policy deciding that requiring
physicians who are hired by employers to perform comprehensive
physicals in an attempt to discover the presence of disease would impose
an unreasonable burden on employers. Therefore, the court held the
employer had not breached its duty to the employee, and upheld the
employer's directed verdict. 14 Tumblin v. Ball-Incon Glass Packaging
Corp., 478 S.E.2d 81 (S.C.App. 1996).

Patient Dumping
Hospital Need Not "Continuously Stabilize" Patient
Under EMTALA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held a
university hospital did not violate the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) by failing to continuously stabilize a
patient, because EMTALA only requires a hospital to provide stabilizing
1 46
treatment to a patient in the immediate aftermath of an emergency.
The administratrix of the deceased patient's estate brought suit
against the defendant university hospital alleging the hospital had failed
to stabilize the patient in violation of EMTALA and, therefore, caused the
patient's death.1 47 The hospital admitted and treated the patient for an

14

Id.

144Id

d at 85-86.
Bryan v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of VA, 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994)).
147Id. at 350.
145
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emergency condition; however, after twelve days of patient care, the
hospital determined it would make no further efforts to prevent the
patient's death. The patient died eight days later during a second lifethreatening episode. 4'
In its analysis of the estate's claim, the court reiterated its longstanding interpretation of EMTALA as a limited anti-dumping statute, the
purpose of which is only to impose on hospitals a legal duty to provide
immediate emergency care."4 Under EMTALA, a hospital must stabilize
a patient in the immediate aftermath of an emergency, but may decide
subsequently either to undertake the long-term treatment of a patient or to
transfer the patient to another hospital after stabilization."' The court held
in light of the actual purpose of EMTALA, the estate's claim could not be
sustained, because the hospital fulfilled its obligations under EMTALA
by providing initial stabilizing treatment to the patient for the first twelve
days of hospitalization!5 Bryan v. Rectors & Visitorsofthe UnhW of Va.,
95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
Products Liability

Court Reverses Certification of Nationwide Class in Products
Liability Case Against Drug Manufacturer
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district
court order certifying a nationwide plaintiff class of consumers in a
products liability action against an epilepsy drug manufacturer. Although
the court found no absolute bar to certification of a multi-state plaintiff
class action in a medical liability context, it held certification in this case
was improper; because it failed to meet procedural requirements for
certification. 152
Plaintiff epileptics brought suit against the drug manufacturer of an
epilepsy drug marketed by the manufacturer without any special warnings

14S

149

Id
Id at 351-352.

l ' Id at352.

5 Id at353.
1 Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
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of serious side effects. Although the drug manufacturer had received
reports of aplastic anemia and liver failure in connection with use of the
drug, his only action had been to mail letters to the physician community
warning them of the various reported risks. s3 Plaintiff consumers sought
class certification, which was entered by the district court." 4
The court first questioned whether the class certified by the district
court would be able to adequately represent those consumers who had
suffered aplastic anemia as a result of the drug, since none ofthe named
consumers had ever suffered the condition.'55 Further, the court found the
notice requirement problematic; because requisite notice is difficult to
give to all potential class members. 5 6 In addition, there had been no
showing by class representatives that issues shared in common by the
class were predominant over individual issues, as required under the
federal rules of civil procedure. 15 7 Finally, the court found the district
court had failed to

Ata- at 1228-1229.
Id. at 1229-1230.
Id. at 1234 (citing Fed. R. Ci. P. 23(a)(3)).
Id (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)).
Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1234 (citing Fed. P, Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
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establish that a class action would be superior to other methods of
adjudication. 5 Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
1996).

Special Education
Special Education Student May Pursue Claims Against School
and Special Education Facility for Failure to Provide Therapy
The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld a special education student's
negligence claim against a special education facility for failure to provide
physical therapy and to notify the student's parents that such care was not
being given. The court found the student's claims, including those
brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and
state special education act (SEA), were not properly pleaded in the
159
complaint
Plaintiffs parents ofspecial education student, appealed a decisionfor
defendants in a suit brought against a school and special education facility,
alleging common law negligence, and violations of the IDEA and SEA.""
Plaintif who suffered from numerous disabilities, including cerebral
palsy, microcephaly, and a seizure disorder, received special education
and care from apublic school and special education facility,' 61 which were
both required to provide the student with daily physical therapy.
Plaintiffs parents brought suit alleging that both defendants had
discontinued physical therapy for more than seven months without
notifying them, thus, causing both of the student's hips to disloeate due to
the development of severe contractures. 16
The court found the plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action
under IDEA and SEA by not alleging, as required by the statutes, that they

diLat 1234-1235 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
Criderv. Bayard City Schs., 553 NAV.2d 147 (Neb. 1996).
Crider,553 NAV.2d at 151 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3301
(Reissue 1994)).
161 Id at 152.
'I

'5'
16

162 _rd
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had exhausted all administrative remedies, or that exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be futile. 163 With regard to the common
law claims, the court found that the student's claim against the school for
failure to notify his parents that therapy was being discontinued did not
state a cause of action, because it failed to allege the school was aware of
the specific therapy program, or the dangers associated with its
discontinuation. 16 In order to correct defects in the student's claims, the
court granted the student leave to amend the complaint to conform with
statutory and common law requirements. 165 Crider v. Bayard City Schs.,
553 N. W.2d 147 (Neb. 1996).

Withholding/Withdrawal of Treatment
Court Refuses to Establish "Wrongful Living"
Claim for Hospital's Failure to Honor
"Do Not Resuscitate" Order
The Supreme Court of Ohio held there was no cause of action for
"wrongful living" arising out of a hospital's administration of life saving
medicine against a patient's wishes. 166 The court determined a claim
arising out ofthe wrongful administration of life-saving or life-prolonging
treatment could only be brought under the tort theories of battery or
negligence, and must be evaluated using a "but for" test for causation. 167
Plaintiffpatient who experienced heart failure and was defibrillated
and revived by a hospital nurse despite a "No Code Blue" order ( Do Not
Resuscitate (DNR) order), filed an action against the hospital fcr damages
resulting from the hospital's failure to obey the "No Code Blue" order.
Two days after being revived and treated, the plaintiff had suffered a
stroke that permanently paralyzed his right side.' 68 Plaintiff a leged that

"I Ia at 155-156.
164 kd
Id
d65at 157.
16
167

Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
Id at228.

I6 Id at 226.
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"but for" the conduct of the hospital his paralyzation would have been
avoided
The issue before the court was whether a hospital was liable for all
foreseeable consequential damages resulting from treatment administered
by a hospital employee to a patient against the patient's instruction. The
court was unwilling to establish a'%vrongful living" action, and held any
damages suffered by the plaintiff must be pursued under a theory of
69
battery or negligence and must establish "but for" causation.
The court concluded that in this case, the patient had failed to
establish the hospital's defibrillation of his heart caused or contributed to
the his stroke. 170 Consequently, summary judgment in favor of the
hospital was granted.17 ' Anderson v. St. Francis-S. GeorgeHosp., Inc.,
671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).

Wrongful Death
Court Finds Counselors Have No Duty to Prevent
Foreseeable Suicides
The Supreme Court of Hawaii held a counselor does not have a duty to
prevent the suicide of an individual he is counseling who is not in the
counselor's custodial care, even if the suicide is foreseeable.17
Plaintiff s family appealed a district court decision in a wrongful
death brought against a Veteran's Service Counselor who had been
counseling plaintiff, a forty-two year old disabled veteran, when he
committed suicide. 7' Plaintiffs claimed the counselor had a duty to
prevent the veteran's suicide based on the special relationship between the
Veterans' Services Counselors and their clients. Second, plaintiffi alleged
the counselor had a duty to prevent the plaintiffs suicide, because it was
foreseeable since plaintiff had told defendant his intentions. Finally, the
I9 Ird at228.
170 Anderson. 671 N.E.2d at 228-229.
171 Id at 229.
11 Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996).
"'
Id at 326-327.
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plaintiffs alleged that veterans are a protected class, thereby, giving rise
to a duty in this case.1 74
Plaintiff's first theory of liability was discarded by the court, which
found that an actor generally does not have a duty to prevent the suicide
of another, unless a special relationship exists between the parties and the
suicide was reasonably foreseeable.17 5 The court declined to find that a
special relationship had existed between the veteran and his counselor
based on public policy, which favors private assistance efforts; and
because a counselor has little control over any client's decision-making
176
when the client is beyond the confines of the counselor's office.
The court also declined to impose a duty on the counselor based on
complete foreseeability, because psychiatric diagnoses are often
uncertain.17 In addition, the court worried that imposing a broad duty on
counselors to reveal private patient information would deter individuals
from seeking needed treatment and subject counselors to civil liability for
disclosure, possibly deterring potential counselors from entering the field.
Forcing counselors to breach counselor-client confidentiality was further
found to be contrary to trends in state legislation granting adults greater
freedom in making personal health care decisions and protecting
communications arising out of mental health counseling.1 7 Lee v.
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996).
Expert's Disagreement Over Failure to Diagnose Depression
Precludes Liability for Mental Patient's Suicide
The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a jury
verdict in favor of a chemical dependency treatment facility and physician
charged with wrongful death by the parents of a mental patient who died
from a self-inflicted gunshot wound while on an authorized twelve-hour

174

Id at 328.

17'

Idl at 331-336.
Id at 337.

17' Lee, 925 P.2d at 328-329.
177

171 Id at 337-342.

1997]

CASENOTES

441

leave from the facility.' 9 The court reached its decision even though
medical experts' who reviewed the case, came to different conclusions
regarding the adequacy of the medical treatment provided to the patient.'
Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf oftheir deceased son who was receiving
treatment at the clinic by the defendants for chemical dependency and
depression. During decedent's stay, the physicians discontinued
administration ofhis antidepressants and psychothempy.' 8 ' Subsequently,
while on an authorized leave from the clinic, decedent was killed by a
self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Decedent's parents argued the defendants had deviated from the
acceptable standard of care by failing to recognize their son suffered from
major depression, and for failing to follow the proper treatment protocol
that included antidepressants, psychotherapy, and psychiatric
consultations. The plaintiffs further contended that defendant physician
failed to follow her own treatment plan, which required that she obtain a
psychiatric consultation in the event the patient's depression continued
and, as a result, defendant had caused or contributed to their son's
suicide.1 2
The issue presented to the court on review was whether the jury's
verdict in favor of the defendants was reasonably supported by the record.
The court reviewed the patient's medical records and testimony of the
medical experts in order to determine whether the physician failed to
recognize the decedent's major depression and failed to provide him with
proper treatment" The court found the testimony of the medical experts
was well supported by the medical record even though the experts'
conclusions regarding the medical treatment provided by the physician
varied."' The court held where review of the patient's actual medical
records indicate the testimony of all medical experts is well-supported,
and it is only the interpretations of the records that differ, ajury's finding

17-

Coxv. Vilis-Knighton IN~ed. Ctr., 680 So. 2d 1309 (La. Ct. App. 1996).

,t' Id at 1319-1320.
"'
Id at 1314.

,
113

Id-at 1316.

Id at 1317.
A at 1319-
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in favor of the defendants is reasonable and must be upheld.8 5 Cox v.
Willis-Knighton Medical Ctr., 680 So. 2d 1309 (Za. C. App. 1996).
LEGISLATION NOTES
Long-Term Care
Nursing Homes no Longer Required to Undergo Annual Reviews
The Second Session of the 104th Congress enacted the Nursing Home
Facility Resident Reform to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act. 186
This act repealed the Medicaid requirement that nursing facilities conduct
an annual review of mentally disabled residents and, instead, requires
reviews for mentally ill or mentally retarded residents only when there is7
a significant change in the resident's physical or mental condition.'8
Under this amendment, a nursing facility must promptly notify the state
mental health authority or state mental retardation or developmental
disability authority upon detection of a significant change in the physical
or mental condition of a resident who is mentally ill or mentally retarded.
After state notification, a review and determination must be conducted
promptly by the nursing facility. These changes became enforceable upon
enactment on October 19, 1996.18 Nursing Home Facility Resident
Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-315, 110 Stat. 3824.
Reproductive Issues
Written Consent Required From Donor Required For
Use of Sperm, Ova, or Embryo in California
The California legislature enacted a bill making it a felony for anyone to
knowingly use sperm, ova, or embryos in assisted reproduction
ss Id at 1320.

186 Nursing Home Facility Resident Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-315, 110 Stat 3824.
197 IJd
Is& .d
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technology for any purpose other than that indicated by the provider's
signature on a written consent form."8 9 This act further makes it a felony
to implant sperm, ova, or embryos through assisted reproduction
technology into a recipient who is not the provider without the signed
written consent of the provider and recipient.19 In response to this act,
state mandated local programs must be created to address these new
crimes. This act took effect upon enactment, September 25, 1996.191 1996
CaL Legis. Serv. 865 (West).

Sexually Dangerous Offenders

Chemical Castration Required in California
The California legislature amended the state penal code and passed a
chemical castration bill enacted on September 18, 1996.192 Under the
chemical castration act, a person convicted of certain sex crimes against
a child under thirteen years of age may be punished by
medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment, commonly known as chemical
castration, upon parole. Further, this act requires chemical castration
upon parole for second-time offenders convicted of a sexual offenses
against a child under thirteen years of age.'93 Chemical treatments must
continue until the state Department of Corrections demonstrates to the
state Board of Prison Terms that treatment is no longer necessary.'94 This
act also permits a criminal offender to choose permanent, surgical
castration as an alternative to chemical treatment.19 Finally, physicians
and surgeons employed by the state Department of Corrections are not
-required to administer chemical castration drugs against their will or to
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1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 865 (West).
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m 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 596 (West).
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inform offenders about the effects and side effects of chemical
treatment. 196
Prior to enactment ofthe chemical castration bill, the state penal code
permitted surgical castration as punishment for criminals who engaged in
sexual crimes against girls under ten years of age. The old provision
granted courts the discretion to determine whether such criminals must
undergo a surgical procedure to prevent procreation in addition to their
other punishment of confinement. The state's new chemical castration bill
provides an alternative to surgical castration and is expected to be less
offensive to the public due to the reversibility of chemical treatment. 1996
CaL Legis. Serv. 596 (West).

Taxation
Contributions to Organ Transplant Funds Tax
Deductible in Rhode Island
The Rhode Island General Assembly enacted an amendment to the state
personal income tax provisions of its code that provides individuals may
deduct from their income tax return a contribution made to the state organ
transplant fund.197 Provisions for the state organ transplant fund deduction
will appear on individual tax forms, and permit a tax payer to donate $1,
$5, $10 or an amount determined by the tax payer. All contributions will
be forwarded to the state organ transplant fund minus deductions for
administrative expenses in conjunction with these contributions. The act
took effect upon passage on August 9, 1996. 1981996 R.I. Pub.Laws 96377.

Id
17 1996 LI. PUB. LAWS 96-377.
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